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RENEWED SOVIET INTEREST IN MRBM/IRBM FORCES, USSR

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
RENEWED SOVIET INTEREST IN MRBM/IRBM FORCES, USSR

ABSTRACT

- 1. The Soviets have shown renewed interest in the MRBM/IRBM forces over the past three years. This interest has been reflected through the increased and varied use of concealment and deception, new building construction, the construction of protective earthen walls at both soft and fixed-field sites, and revetment construction in the nuclear warhead storage areas at some of the launch sites.
- 2. These changes to the previously consistent and patterned operation of the Soviet MRBM/IRBM forces are discussed in this report; this report also includes a location map and annotated photographs.

INTRODUCTION

- 3. For the past ten years, the operational SS-4/5 missile sites along the USSR periphery have been maintained with few major changes in either the operation or configuration of the sites (Figure 1). However, during the past three years, the Soviets have shown a renewed interest in these sites. Recent activities have included the increased and varied use of canvas/netting for concealment, identifiable attempts at deception, and protective earthen wall and revetment construction at soft sites, fixed-field sites. Such activity has increased the difficulty of monitoring the previously consistent and patterned operational MRBM/IRBM forces. At a minimum, Soviet efforts indicate an increased interest in concealment and deception (C and D), and making these facilities more defensible.
- 4. Certainly a C and D program has to be considered as an explanation for some of the activity observed at these sites during the past three years. Although the authority and scope of the Soviet MRBM/IRBM C and D program are not fully known, that such a program exists, at least at some Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) regimental levels, can be inferred from the examples included in this report.







FIGURE 1. LOCATIONS OF SOVIET MRBM AND IRBM COMPLEXES, USSR



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Earthe	n Wall and Revetmer	nt Construction
11.		rotective earthen walls, first observed at Yelsk MRBM Launch Site
1 clude S	S-4 fixed-field sites), appears to have been expanded subsequently to in- launch positions at Dyatlovo MRBM Launcher
Position		vatlovo SSM Launcher Position 3 and Gresk SSM were observed with earthen walls around parts of one or more
launch	positions. Since July, l	aunch positions at Taurage SSM Launcher Position 2
	nd Lida SSM Launcher t earthen walls to be by	r Position 1 have been observed with similar walls. uilt at SS-4 MRBM fixed-field sites were at Yelsk SSM Launcher
Position	2 (e seen in January 1974	and Kozhanovichi SSM Launcher Position 3 and April 1974 respectively. These complexes
were als		ve protective earthen walls built around the launch pads at the soft
12.		ng constructed at the SS-4 fixed-field sites appear to be identical to
		These walls have now been observed at over 90 percent of the 116 oft sites, and it is anticipated that they will be built at more of the


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]	SS-4 fixed-field sites. The specific reason for the Soviet decision to construct these walls is still unknown; however, possible explanations must include providing some physical protection against at-		
1	ack and some degree of psychological reassurance to the personnel manning the sites. 13. Beginning in October 1973, the Soviets also began constructing revetments at some of		
5	their MRBM/IRBM nuclear warhead storage facilities (Figure 8). The revetments vary in size, shape, and disposition, and they appear to be for protection of vehicles and equipment usually associated with the warhead unit. This construction is not as widespread as the earthen walls, and,		
1	herefore, might be only a local modification to the overall earthen wall construction program.		
	REFERENCES		



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